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We consider a number of Artificial Chemistry models for economic activity and what consequences
they have for the formation of economic inequality. We are particularly interested in what tax
measures are effective in dampening economic inequality. By starting from well-known kinetic
exchange models, we examine different scenarios for reducing the tendency of economic activity
models to form unequal wealth distribution in equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s societies suffer, for the most part, from a form
of economic inequality that seems very difficult to treat
or even only to attempt to remedy. Governments and
economists have made repeated efforts to address this
problem, realizing that it is connected to many other
serious survival problems of contemporary societies, like
climate change [27], loss of biodiversity [21], racial and
gender injustice [32, 35], health problems [18] and others.
Historians have studied the problem in a perspective
across times and generations, and found that it is part of
a complex of problems that cause societies to collapse [7].
Simulation models have been formulated that corrobo-
rate the causal relationship between economic inequality
and societal collapse [22]. In turn, some historians have
delved into a historical analysis of the reasons for the
retreat of economic inequality, finding societal collapse
among them. Their more general findings point to other
probably even more harmful and violent causes, catas-
trophic events like epidemics, wars and revolutions that
- together with societal collapse - are virtually the only
reasons for a retreat of inequality (see the comprehensive
study of Scheidel [31]). Economic inequality seems to be
entrenched and potential non-harming remedies seriously
lacking.
Natural scientists have weighed in on this discussion
as well, pointing out that situations of equality in both
nature and society can be compared and are ideal sym-
metrical states, bound to disappear into non-symmetrical
states as soon as the pressure for equality is reduced [30].
Studies have found that inequality of ”wealth” - properly
defined - also exists in the animal world [6], curiously in
a similar distribution as among humans. The obvious
question to ask then is, whether the unequal distribution
in quantities like wealth or species abundance, in other
words in stocks in both natural and social systems, and
to a lesser extent the unequal distribution in quantities
of flows like income or energy are expressions of universal
laws that are acting in both the natural and the human-
made (social) world. Econophysics is one of the fields
that asks such questions [20, 33] and our contribution
here will address some of the assumptions of such mod-
els in the sections below.
Among economists and social scientists there is agree-
ment about the status of economic inequality in societies
around the globe, with the United States a particularly
egregious example [25, 28]. Governments have developed
tools to address such issues, with taxes among the most
widely used. As is well known, taxes actually play multi-
ple roles in societies, and those roles should be conceptu-
ally kept separate if one wants to apply those tools. The
three major roles of taxes are (i) to generate income for
government entities on the national, state or local level
in order to offer services to the population; (ii) to redis-
tribute wealth between segments of a society; and (iii) to
penalize and discourage certain habits or uses among the
population. For clarity purposes, here we prefer to dis-
cern the usage of this term and speak of government taxes
and fees for purpose (i), redistributive taxes for purpose
(ii) and penalty taxes for purpose (iii).
Among what is the general (and less discerning) usage
of the term ”tax”, a number of different tools have been
applied to generate cost-recovery for government services,
like sales taxes, value added taxes, income taxes, wealth
taxes, inheritance taxes, luxury taxes, etc. Easiest to ad-
minister are certainly those taxes that are applied dur-
ing the event of a transaction, like a sales tax at the
moment when an actual sale happens. Less easy to ad-
minister are taxes that span a period of time, like taxes
for earnings or interest, to be collected when a transfer of
earning or interest happens periodically. Both of these
taxes can be tied to relatively easily measurable flows.
The most difficult taxes to administer are those that are
tied to a stock, like wealth or inheritance taxes. Disputes
quickly ensue about the measurability and comparability
of stocks, their discountability etc, and, depending on the
interest of a party, minimization strategies are applied to
circumvent the tax duty following from a tax on stocks
of any kind. An answer to such behavioural variations
is probably offered by game theory, but for the moment,
we shall have to postpone consideration of tax avoidance
strategies and focus on the results of applying idealized
taxing policies. Note also that we do not consider any
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2other method for avoiding economic inequality in this
paper, though there might be other routes to improve
equality like the creation or fostering of a gift economy
which, however, would require basic systemic changes to
economic activity.
Among economists, there is an ongoing discussion
about the relation between taxation and productivity.
Under the assumption that productivity and taxation are
conflicting goals in a society, optimization methods seem
to be an appropriate approach to reconcile those con-
flicting goals. While economists formulated and studied
optimal taxation theories [15, 16, 29], progress in tech-
niques like computer simulation has allowed a whole set
of models to be explored in this arena. The idea of such
models is that while they will often be very simple ab-
stracted models of reality, their results can teach us a
lot about general taxation effects which can then be re-
fined and underpinned by theoretical investigations. The
econophysics models of wealth formation as well as the
study of phenomena equivalent to wealth in ecologies are
two examples already mentioned earlier.
Here we suggest another route to explore taxation
models, by virtue of very simple multi-agent systems
called Artificial Chemistries [2, 8]. Artificial chem-
istry models are based on an analogy between the sys-
tem under consideration and a chemical reaction sys-
tem. Stochastic interactions (”reactions”) happen be-
tween agents called ”molecules” which obey predeter-
mined rules. In contrast to many other MAS, however,
the behavioural rules of these molecular agents are sim-
ple and identical among agents of the same type, thus
allowing the collective effects to emerge clearly from the
set of chosen rules.
Here we are interested exclusively in distributive tax
effects. But before we go into details of such AC mod-
els of wealth distribution, the major result of the current
investigation can be summarized as follows: These very
simple abstracted models of (economic) interaction be-
tween agents result in a general outcome: income tax is
overrated as a means to achieve economic equality, or
a remedy to at least reduce economic inequality. Even
income taxes at the high end of the scale (progressive,
high marginal rates) do only slightly dampen, but do not
eliminate economic inequality. One needs to introduce a
wealth tax to tackle the problem. Due to the simplicity
of the model, this result is general and can be expected to
hold even if more complicated interactions or structures
are envisioned. We do not rule out, of course, that from
a practical point of view, a combination of different taxes
needs to be employed, but a proper wealth tax needs to
be the major component of any system that hopes to
substantially reduce economic inequality.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The next
section (Section II) briefly reflects the current knowledge
on income and wealth distribution, Section III then
discusses the kinetic exchange model of econophysics
and its key assumptions and results. Section IV explains
our artificial chemistry model of economic activity in
FIG. 1. Wealth distribution for 1996 (UK), top, reproduced
from [10], and income distribution for 1997 (US), bottom,
reproduced from [9].
detail. Section V then provides the simulation results
of the model using different scenarios with and without
different types of taxes. Section VI discusses various
counter-arguments against the primary result and some
practical implementation issues, Section VII concludes
by putting the results in perspective. An Appendix
gives more details on distributive effects of some of the
models studied.
II. INCOME AND WEALTH DISTRIBUTION
Income and wealth distribution in virtually all coun-
tries of the world cannot be described other than unequal.
Unfortunately, this is not a temporary situation brought
about by some economic downturn or some unsuccessful
or incapable attempts of governments on behalf of their
citizens. Instead, it is a systemic, long-term problem of
virtually all present and historic societies, the source of
many of the problems that caused and still cause the col-
lapse of their organization and of the well-being of their
citizenry. As Piketty has pointed out in his large-scale
study [25] this problem will continue in the 21st century
until we find a means to seriously fight its root causes.
The history of human economies provides a rich field
for learning about trends and tendencies. The anthro-
pology/archaeology pair Kohler and Smith [17] provide
a larger overview of the history of inequality in human
societies. The Italian economist and sociologist Pareto
3FIG. 2. Wealth distribution for top 1%, 90-99%, 50-90% and
bottom 50% of population, development 1989-2020. [1]
studied wealth distribution in Europe already in the 19th
century. He found that wealth distribution for the richer
segments of a society follows a power law, today known
as the Pareto law [24]. This sector refers to the upper
echelons of wealth and income, whereas the lower part of
the distribution curve can be fit well with an exponen-
tial or Gibbs distribution or a log-normal distribution.
Yakovenko and Rosser [36], based on [11] offer a good
review of data and models of income and wealth distri-
bution. However, data on wealth are difficult to come by
and often proxies have to be used. Figures from the UK
on wealth (derived from inheritance) for 1996 and from
the US on income distribution for 1997 produce a similar
picture (see Figure 1), though.
Commenting on income distribution, Chakrobarti et al
write [4]:
”These observed regularities in income distri-
bution may thus indicate a ’natural’ law in
economics.”
For the United States, further evidence comes from
statistics showing the development of wealth distribution
across percentiles of the population, Figure 2. As of early
2020, the top 1% own more than 25% of the assets, while
the bottom 50% have a share of approximately 5-7% of
the assets.
Again, given that wealth seems to follow the same dis-
tribution as income, it makes sense to use a universal
explanation for these tendencies, even if details might be
different.
III. THE KINETIC EXCHANGE MODEL
The kinetic exchange model for economic activity
starts with the hypothesis that the economic exchange
activity of individual economic agents in the form of
trades can be compared to the movement and encounter
of gas particles exchanging energy [5, 9]. In place of en-
tropy maximization in the case of energy exchange they
would follow utility maximization principles in the case
of economic trades. Money would take the place of en-
ergy. Benoit Mandelbrot [19] has succinctly summarized
this idea:
”There is a great temptation to consider the
exchanges of money which occur in economic
interaction as analogous to the exchanges of
enegy which occur in physical shocks between
molecules. In the loosest possible terms,
both kinds of interactions ”should” lead to
”similar’ states of equilibrium. That is, one
”should” be able to explain the law of income
distribution by a model similar to that used
in statistical thermodynamics ...”
Mandelbrot goes on to point out that actual income
distribution is different, and considers models to accom-
modate that difference. But the general idea of these
models is that if you have a population of agents that in-
teract in a random fashion with each other, the distribu-
tion of income and wealth approach certain equilibrium
distributions well known from physics.
Key assumptions of the simplest of these models of
income and - by way of transfer - wealth distributions
are (i) a closed economic system in which the number of
economic agents and the total wealth of the system re-
main constant, i.e. that trading exchange is the prevalent
mode of economic activity; (ii) trading is restricted to
two-agent interactions; (iii) there is no negative wealth,
thus an exchange cannot result in such and debt needs
not be considered; (iv) the exchange is symmetrical, in
that the basis of the exchange is normally a fixed amount
or a percentage of the sum of the wealth of the partic-
ipating agents; (v) the exchange conserves money, i.e.
the amount given to one agent is taken from the other so
that the exchange does not change the total amount of
wealth in the system; (vi) an exchange process does not
depend on previous exchange processes, so the dynamics
is Markovian.
Key results of these models are that the income/wealth
distribution develops indeed unequally among the popu-
lation of agents, and, regardless of what the initial con-
ditions of the exchange dynamics are, tends to an equi-
librium that has a distribution that looks similar to an
exponential (Gibbs) or log-normal (Gibrat) distribution.
The details vary based on model assumptions. For exam-
ple, if there is an additional assumption of savings (re-
served amounts of wealth not available for the economic
exchange) then such models tend to reflect wealth dis-
tribution in societies more closely. In particular, the tail
of the previous distribution is now modified and follows
a power law (Pareto law), just as empirically observed.
Details can be found in [4, 36].
The kinetic exchange model has been criticized by
economists as being unrealistic and even, to a degree,
misleading [13]. One key criticism is
”The industrialised economies of the West,
and increasingly of Asia, are emphatically not
4a conservative system: income is not, like en-
ergy in physics, conserved by economic pro-
cesses. Therefore, it is a fundamental fallacy
to base economic models on a principle of
conservation. Yet this is an inevitable con-
sequence of exchange-only models, since ex-
change is a conservative process.”
We don’t think that this criticism is indeed the core of
the problem because it is not a fundamental limitation of
exchange models. There are other kinetic exchange mod-
els that allow for some of the money to go into taxation
[3, 12, 14], thus reducing the amount that is available
to the agents subsequently. We show in this contribu-
tion how easily such models can be formulated. In the
same vain one could imagine that money is gained in the
process of exchange, thus allowing both agents to bene-
fit from the exchange process and generating a growing
economy [26, 34].
However, the issue is probably related to the fact that
kinetic model are often theoretical and ”... much of the
econophysics community appears to think that simply
doing good science is sufficient to have the work recog-
nised, rather than relating to the motivations and incen-
tives of policy makers ...” [23]. In the following, we in-
tend to discuss an example of an easily formulated model
with an exclusive focus on the purpose of the model: to
understand distributional effects.
IV. USING AN ARTIFICIAL CHEMISTRY AS
AN AGENT-BASED MODEL FOR ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY
Our agent-based model is based on an Artificial Chem-
istry (AC) [2] with the idea that it is the interaction of
agents that is the most important driver of distribution
of wealth and income. The detailed nature of that inter-
action will determine the exact distribution of wealth in
a population of agents, but for our modelling purposes
here, we study as simple a model as possible.
The baseline model assumes that all agents are ho-
mogeneous in their behaviour, while possibly possessing
different amounts of wealth. Their interaction is based
on the following AC rules. In each iteration randomly
chosen agents i and j, possessing amounts of respective
wealth of mi and mj encounter each other and exchange
a good for an amount of money ∆m (see Figure 3). In
terms of an AC, the population is in a well-mixed reaction
vessel without inflow or outflow. We are not interested
in studying the flow of goods in the economy, only the
flow of money. Thus, we assume something of value will
flow in the counter direction of the money flow, with-
out further specifying the nature of that flow. We are
not allowing negative wealth, so ∆m will be determined
as a random percentage of the smaller of the amounts
mi and mj . Alternatively, we could define the attempt
to exchange the larger amount of money as an ”elastic
collision” of the agents, but that would simply force us
FIG. 3. Agents with wealth m1,m2 at time t interact and
exchange money ∆m in the process, resulting in agents with
wealth m′1,m
′
2 at time t + 1.
to draw another pair of agents, and therefore delay the
relaxation of the system.
Suppose mi < mj , and a percentage p flows in the
direction mj . Then each agent updates their ”wealth” in
iteration t + 1 with the following equations:
mi(t + 1) = mi(t)−∆m
mj(t + 1) = mj(t) + ∆m
(1)
with
∆m = p ·mi (2)
Note that only one agent, randomly chosen, receives
money, the other is supposed to receive a correspond-
ing good. The total amount of money is, of course, un-
changed by this operation, but the operation is asym-
metrical. Since the smaller amount determines the ac-
tual flow, if one of the agents is getting very poor with
a wealth close to 0, the amount flowing is getting corre-
spondingly smaller, and the exchange creeps to a halt.
We do not modulate the probability of exchanges based
on their size in this baseline model.
As has been pointed out above, the kinetic exchange
models of econophysics assume a symmetrical exchange,
based on the sum of both agents’ wealth, and having
money flowing in both directions. This makes sense
when thinking about energy flows in a physical sys-
tem, but here we are discussing a different system where
the assumption of symmetry is not justified. Artificial
chemistries are no stranger to asymmetrical processes, in
fact, it is their general case.
The result of the kinetic exchange model is that it
equilibrizes much faster and to a less unequal distribu-
tion. Our model’s equilibrium state is extreme, with one
agent of the population holding all the wealth, and all
others holding none, even when starting from a fully
equal wealth distribution at the outset. The relax-
ation times for approaching this equilibrium are, how-
ever, much longer, so that in a reasonable simulation it
is never reached.
Figure 4 compares our AC model with the kinetic ex-
change model of Dragulescu and Yakovenko [9] at differ-
ent iterations. That model determines the exchange of
money as a percentage of the average wealth of the two
5FIG. 4. Wealth distribution in population of 1,000 agents (10
bins, a.u.). Comparison of baseline economic exchange model
(left) and kinetic exchange model (right) at t = 1, 000; 10, 000;
and 100, 000. Initial distribution was equal among all 1,000
agents.
agents:
∆m = p · (mi + mj)/2 (3)
We can see clearly that the inequality resulting from
the asymmetrical agent model is even higher and form-
ing faster than the unequal wealth distribution from the
kinetic exchange model. Note that both simulations
started from an equal distribution of wealth among all
1,000 agents. But regardless of initial state, both mod-
els develop heavy inequality. Many other model vari-
ants can be formulated that lead to qualitatively similar
results: Even from an ideal state of equal distribution
among agents, wealth inequality develops as if it were a
natural law.
A classical measure of economic inequality is provided
by the Gini coefficient g, 0 ≤ g ≤ 1, defined as:
g =
1
2N2m¯
∑
i,j
‖mi −mj‖ (4)
Figure 5 shows the Gini coefficient for both simulations
and how it develops over time. As expected, for the ki-
netic model approaching an exponential distribution, the
Gini coefficient fluctuates around 1/2 which signals a sub-
stantial inequality in wealth distribution among agents.
For our baseline model, the Gini approaches 1, the most
unequal Gini coefficient possible. Generally speaking,
Gini coefficients below 0.25 indicate high equality in a
distribution.
FIG. 5. Gini coefficients in population of 1,000 agents for the
baseline economic and the kinetic exchange model. Initial
distribution was equal among all 1,000 agents.
V. RESULTS
In this section we shall discuss our simulation results
on the following different scenarios:
1. A flat income tax with regular (30%), high (60%)
and low (5%) values
2. A progressive income tax between 30% and 75%
3. A wealth tax of medium, high and low value
For some of these tax regimes, we also study different
redistribution cases.
I Redistribution to all tax payers
II Redistribution to a select group of tax payers (those
with negative income, or lower half of wealth distri-
bution)
As emphasized earlier, in these simulations we do not
consider tax as income for local, state or federal govern-
ments. This is an important, but different consideration
for tax usage. Rather, we are interested only in the dis-
tributional effects of very simple interaction rules. When
we show distributional effects, we also do not show ab-
solute values, we rather bin into deciles of wealth, i.e.
agents relative to each other.
A. A Flat Income Tax
In the flat income tax regime we apply a given tax rate
r to the income of each agent, as it develops over periods
of time. In the current simulations, we apply the tax
every 10 iterations to the difference of wealth an agent
has accumulated over this period. Thus, we adjust each
agent i’s wealth by the following formula:
mi(t) = mi(t)− r[mi(t)−mi(t− 10)] (5)
6FIG. 6. Wealth distribution in population of 1,000 agents (10
bins, a.u.). Flat income tax regime, with regular flat tax of
30%. Comparison of case l (left) and case II (right) for re-
distribution policy at t = 1, 000; 10, 000; and 100, 000. Initial
distribution was equal among all 1,000 agents. Difference is
virtually not visible.
provided its earnings over the period, mi(t)−mi(t−10),
are positive. Otherwise, we do nothing.
Once tax from all agents has been collected in the pe-
riod, resulting in an amount T (t), we distribute it back
to the agents according to (I) equal redistribution; or (II)
select redistribution. This updates the wealth of agent i
again to:
mi(t) = mi(t) +
T (t)
N
∀i ∈ N (Case I)
mi(t) = mi(t) +
T (t)
|Nn| ∀i ∈ Nn (Case II)
(6)
where Nn is the set of all those who loose in the trans-
actions, i.e. those agents with negative income over the
period mi(t)−mi(t− 10) < 0.
Figure 6 shows the results of applying a flat income tax
of r = 30% and subsequent equal redistribution of the re-
sulting taxes to all (case I) or the agents that have lost
income in the transaction (case II). While in the early
stages of the interactions there is some difference visi-
ble, that difference seems to become smaller and smaller
as the number of interactions increases. We show the
Gini coefficients for these flat tax experiments in the Ap-
pendix. The vast majority of agents has become very
poor, despite the application of an income tax, and de-
spite starting out with an exact equal distribution of
wealth.
One other way of looking at the distributional effects
of taxes is to depict the development of wealth in certain
FIG. 7. Wealth development in different quantiles of the pop-
ulation of 1,000 agents. Flat income tax regime, with regular
flat tax of 30%. Comparison of income tax application with
redistribution to all, case I (above) and baseline case, untaxed
(below). Initial distribution was equal among all 1,000 agents.
Quantiles shown: Bottom half of the population vs top 10%
and top 1% wealthiest agents.
quantiles of the population. Figure 7 compares these dis-
tributional effects of the 30% flat tax rate with the un-
taxed system. So, there actually is an effect of a flat
income tax policy on distribution of wealth (note the
difference in scales) for different quantiles of the pop-
ulation, with the untaxed system approaching 100% of
wealth possession rather quickly, but this tendency is
only dampened to a degree in the case of a flat income
tax. A higher flat tax rate does further dampen the in-
equality, see Figure 8, but even at 60% flat tax rate very
substantial inequality ensues.
We present a final set of simulations on a flat income
tax by moving in the opposite direction: A low flat tax
rate of 5% (Figure 9) which again demonstrates the in-
fluence of income tax rates on wealth inequality, though
a weak one in this case.
B. A Progressive Income Tax
Now we present simulations on a progressive income
tax, applied with a rate of between 15% and 45%, 60%
and 75%. The lowest amount is applied for income above
a certain tax-free threshold. While this is arbitrary, in
light of the starting wealth of each agent, we set the low-
est rate to begin taxing at incomes of $150. In order
7FIG. 8. Wealth development in different quantiles of the pop-
ulation of 1,000 agents. Flat income tax regime, with high
flat tax of 60%. Initial distribution was equal among all 1,000
agents. Quantiles shown: Bottom half of the population vs
top 10% and top 1% wealthiest agents.
FIG. 9. Wealth development in different quantiles of the pop-
ulation of 1,000 agents. Flat income tax regime, with high
flat tax of 5%. Initial distribution was equal among all 1,000
agents. Quantiles shown: Bottom half of the population vs
top 10% and top 1% wealthiest agents.
to keep things simple, we linearly increase the tax rate
between this minimum and the maximum being reached
at $850, $1,200 and $1,550, respectively, for the above
mentioned maximal tax rate. So there is some amount
of income free of taxes, but the tax rate quickly rises to
the maximum value.
Figure 10 shows the development of the distribution
of wealth in the population over 100,000 iterations. The
effects of this tax regime are quite similar to those of a
flat tax of 30%. Figure 11 (top) shows the application of
a 60% marginal tax rate, and Figure 11 (bottom) shows
the application of a serious 75% marginal tax rate.
While it is obvious that there is an effect of the higher
marginal tax on the development of wealth, the effect is
not as serious as one might expect from a marginal tax
rate of 75%! In fact, the redistributive effect is quite
disappointing, despite an effort that sounds very serious.
The top 1% have gained a share of 10% of the assets while
the bottom half has lost most of its half of the assets and
stands at about 8% of assets after 100,000 iterations.
FIG. 10. Wealth development in different quantiles of the
population of 1,000 agents. Progressive income tax regime,
with tax rate of between 15% and 45%, linearly growing in
the income interval from $150 to $850. Initial distribution was
equal among all 1,000 agents. Quantiles shown: Bottom half
of the population vs top 10% and top 1% wealthiest agents.
In summary, a very simple Artificial Chemistry model
of economic activity that allows a starting state of all
agents having equal wealth – a condition no society can
hope to start from – will always quickly develop economic
inequality under an income tax regime intended to dis-
tribute wealth. We are not saying that income taxes do
not have an effect, in fact, it can be seen that larger
marginal tax rates do have effects, but these effects are
tiny compared to the goal of keeping economic equality
in a society. If one further adds the consideration that
no society starts with perfect equality, but would have to
start from a situation of economic inequality at the out-
set, the outlook for income tax remedies is even worse.
C. A Wealth Tax
We now turn to another tax model that is not based on
income, but on accumulated wealth. This tax is applied
to the total of an agent’s wealth, but the frequency of its
application is reduced to a tenth. That is approximately
the relation between applying a tax every month vs once
a year. Here we are not concerned about the practicality
of such a tax, but its mere ”theoretical” application and
effects.
Our first wealth tax, which simply takes each agent’s
wealth and subjects it to a flat tax we call regular is ap-
plying a rate of 30%. Thus, at a frequency 10 times lower
than the previous income tax which taxed the difference
in wealth in a given period, we now tax the entire posses-
sion of the agent. Figure 12 shows the distributional ef-
fect of such a wealth tax after 1, 000; 10, 000 and 100, 000
iterations. The total of the tax is redistributed equally
to all agents, our previous case I.
Figure 13 shows how the quantiles develop under such a
tax. As is clearly visible, after an early relaxation phase,
wealth distribution of certain quantiles of the popula-
tion are quite stable in a band. The bottom half of the
8FIG. 11. Wealth development in different quantiles of the
population of 1,000 agents. Progressive income tax regime,
with tax rate of between 15% and 60%, linearly growing in the
income interval from $150 to $1,200 (top) and between 15%
and 75%, linearly growing in the income interval from $150
to $1,550 (bottom). Initial distribution was equal among all
1,000 agents. Quantiles shown: Bottom half of the population
vs top 10% and top 1% wealthiest agents.
population quickly looses around 10% of its share, but re-
mains stable thereafter. The top 10% of the population
gain around 5-6% of additional wealth while the top 1%
moves up to a share of approximately 2.5%. While these
are big numbers still, they are in no way comparable to
the quantile development with an income tax. The rea-
son is that always the full amount of wealth accumulated
by an agent is the basis of taxation. This, in combi-
nation with the systematic redistribution of all proceeds
from the tax allows the agents to develop their wealth in
only a tiny band. Figure 12 actually shows a healthy dis-
tribution, with most agents in the middle bin (”middle
class”), and a more or less symmetric, but quickly falling
occupation of bins higher and lower in wealth.
We also examined a high wealth tax regime of taxing
wealth at 60% and a low regime of taxing it at 5%, see
Figures 14 and 15. What is striking is that a wealth
tax in general is able to quickly stabilize a distribution
of wealth in the population, of course at different levels
depending on the severity of the tax. We can see from
the graphs that a 60% wealth tax does not add much
distributional utility compared to only half of that rate
(the regular case). A low wealth tax (here 5%) as it is
conventionally discussed in economic circles as a max-
FIG. 12. Development of wealth distribution in population
of 1,000 agents (10 bins, a.u.). Flat wealth tax regime, with
regular flat tax of 30% at t = 1, 000; 10, 000; and 100, 000 iter-
ations. Initial distribution was equal among all 1,000 agents.
Very effective redistribution of wealth, keeping the middle
class dominant.
imum measure (and normally discarded), on the other
hand, leads to a more familiar distribution of wealth in
the population. If we choose an even lower tax rate for
such a flat wealth tax, say a 1% rate, we can see effects
similar to a strong income tax (see Appendix).
These results seem at first sight somewhat counter-
intuitive. Why would a wealth tax have so much stronger
distributive effects than an income tax? After all, an
income tax is supposed to tax the changes in wealth, so
shouldn’t it have the same effect as an admittedly smaller
9FIG. 13. Wealth development in different quantiles of the
population of 1,000 agents. Initial distribution was equal
among all 1,000 agents. Quantiles shown: Bottom half of
the population vs top 10% and top 1% wealthiest agents.
FIG. 14. Wealth distribution in population of 1,000 agents (10
bins, a.u.). Flat wealth tax regime, with high (60%) and low
(5%) flat tax of 30%. Comparison of high (left) and low (right)
for redistribution policy at t = 1, 000; 10, 000; and 100, 000.
Initial distribution was equal among all 1,000 agents. High
wealth tax increases wealth of middle class, low wealth tax
reduced it in favour of a few high net-worth individuals.
tax on the entire wealth? The answer is ”yes”. But one
needs to keep in mind that income is only a tiny portion
of overall wealth of an individual agent, and its influence
in our model shrinks as economic inequality grows larger
(since exchange is determined by the agent with smaller
wealth). Thus, an income tax becomes progressively less
effective in curbing the differential effects of wealth in
a population. From our simulations, we can see that a
wealth tax of approximately 1% corresponds to a high flat
income tax of 60%, a close to two orders of magnitude
difference in effectiveness!
FIG. 15. Wealth development in different quantiles of the
population of 1,000 agents. Different flat wealth tax regime,
with tax rate of of 60% (top) and 5% (bottom). Initial dis-
tribution was equal among all 1,000 agents. Quantiles shown:
Bottom half of the population vs top 10% and top 1% wealth-
iest agents. Distributions quickly stabilize after a short relax-
ation period.
Note that the assumption of an asymmetric role of
agents in an exchange is crucial. Absent the ability to
go into debt, an agent can only afford and pay for goods
and services up to the value of their wealth (but nor-
mally even to a smaller amount). Thus, the larger the
difference in wealth between two agents, the smaller the
amount of exchange in relation to the wealth of the agent
with larger wealth, and therefore, the smaller the effect of
their income tax. In other words, as economic inequality
grows, so does the inefficiency of income taxes.
VI. DISCUSSION
The natural question to ask, then, is how would one
implement such a wealth tax on a larger scale and in
reality? This question is especially important, given the
counter-arguments that will be recruited to discourage
any attempt at this. In the following we shall discuss
these aspects in particular in light of
• The attempts at tax avoidance
• The availability of funds for a wealth tax (the liq-
uidity problem)
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• The redistribution vs. government support role of
taxes
• Issues of enforcement and practical measures
• The possibility of a combinations of a wealth tax
with a guaranteed basic income or other ideas
Before we address these implementation questions,
we would like to discuss some of the obvious reserva-
tions raised by opponents of a wealth tax. A non-
comprehensive list of counter-arguments from economists
could include the following arguments:
• The model builds a closed system, with no agents
coming and going. — This is a correct observation,
but in contrast to many other models of the econ-
omy, in principle, we can randomly introduce and
remove agents from this system (akin to birth and
death processes). This can be examined, but it will
not bring substantially different other aspects into
consideration, except that one might want to study
the effects of an inheritance tax. But the nice thing
about a wealth is that an inheritance is, sooner or
later, appearing as a contribution to wealth, and
already covered by a wealth tax, if only with a de-
lay.
• Another argument, frequently brought up against
kinetic exchange models, and transferable to this
model is that production is actually the main driver
of an economy, not the exchange between partic-
ipants. Any production or gain in productivity
would not be reflected here. — Again, this ob-
servation is correct, but this is not the point of
the model. In fact, absolute values of wealth are
not studied here, we instead only look at the rela-
tive position of agents in the wealth hierarchy. For
the study of distribution, which is relative among
agents, the influence by the absolute growth of the
economy is not of interest. We could even add an
amount akin to production gains to the amounts to
be distributed, but that will not make distributive
changes.
• The model does not accurately reflect the wealth
distribution found empirically. — Again, this is by-
and-large correct, but not the point of this model
either. This model studies the rough distributional
effects of taxation, not the exact outcome. There
are other models that attempt much closer accu-
racy when modelling, see, e.g., savings efforts and
their effects on the long tail of the distribution in
kinetic exchange models [4].
• All of this is well known since the 1960s. — Per-
haps yes, but given the critical importance of a
wealth tax as a remedy against economic inequal-
ity, it seems that it is not worked on properly for
serious implementation purposes. We thus would
argue for more research and a closer look at rela-
tively high wealth taxes and their implementation.
• Wealth in general is difficult to measure, and there-
fore it is difficult to tax. — As a general observa-
tion, this is certainly true. But property taxes (on
private homes) are an example of how wealth (in a
certain branch of the economy) can be measured.
The message is again one of relative versus absolute
measurements. As long as the same principles are
applied to wealth of the same type, their relative
differences will go into the tax calculation. That
is enough to have distributive effects. The actual
weight of a type of wealth and the rate of redistri-
bution is then subject to political considerations.
• The real purpose of taxes is not redistribution, but
state income. — The aspect of state funding is cer-
tainly in need to be addressed. This can be done
by removing part of the redistribution amounts and
transferring them to the state. It is again an abso-
lute, not relative amount we are talking about here,
and as such, it cannot have distributive effects.
Let us return now to the implementation questions
posed above.
Attempts at tax avoidance
Any tax system will have to deal with a certain degree
of tax cheating and systematic tax avoidance schemes.
As for the cheating, one cannot avoid that, but it will
probably remain in the same proportion as our current
tax systems. If anything, a tax system that is perceived
as more just will likely be at the lower end of the cheat-
ing proportion. As for systematic tax avoidance, this can
only be addressed by a certain degree of auditing. A tax
system based on a wealth tax is not fundamentally dif-
ferent in this regard from a tax system based on income
taxes. If anything, a simple flat wealth tax will prob-
ably be easier to administer and audit (in particular if
there can be specialist audit teams formed for different
types of wealth, that work together to determine overall
amounts). As we indicated earlier, a likely candidate for
examining avoidance effects is game theory.
Liquidity
This is indeed a problem for high net-worth individ-
uals that might be taxed substantial amounts without
being able to mobilize the necessary liquidity from the
assets taxed. It is likely best to keep an income tax in
place, and implement the calculation based on a wealth
tax with the annual tax declaration which then would
consider the income tax as an advance payment on the
final wealth tax amounts. To be clear: We envision a tax
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system entirely based on a wealth tax, but contempora-
neously relying on an income tax as a source of liquidity.
This would include dividend and interest payments taxed
at source (a withholding tax). Illiquid assets, however,
would likely have to be sold, at least partially to procure
enough liquidity for tax payments. A pragmatic delay
for required payments could be installed, also taking ac-
count of the amounts redistributed to everyone from the
overall tax revenue. As for the amounts returned to tax-
payers, these could be based on an estimate of the tax
volume expected in any given year, and corrected in a
subsequent year with the actual amounts.
Government Support versus Redistribution
Federal, state and local governments draw income from
taxes and fees, but taxes are their primary source for
providing services. We have not modelled such a pur-
pose of taxes in this contribution. However, it can be
easily accommodated if the system is opened to the out-
side world and production is introduced as a source of
additional income. Our assumption then would be that
the government’s share of income cannot be larger (and
should preferably be smaller) than production income.
Issues of Enforcement and Practical Measures
Enforcing the payment of a tax is best done by collect-
ing it at source. This cannot easily be done with a wealth
tax, so it is better to tax every income at an appropri-
ate rate, and then to compensate the year after. Certain
countries are better equipped for enforcing tax payments,
especially given the potential that wealth moves to an-
other country, but the general approach would be a col-
laboration between nations.
Combinations of a Wealth Tax with a Guaranteed Basic
Income or other Ideas
We do not exclude the possibility that the best course
of action would be a combination of the wealth tax with
some sort of guaranteed basic income. However, for now
we have not included that or other modifications into our
taxation scheme.
VII. CONCLUSION
The simulations reported here use a very simple model
of economic activity. Basing a study of economic activity
on artificial chemistries opens a different way of examin-
ing collective effects in economic models. Notably, we are
completely free to define the interaction rules between
agents based on what we believe is important and ig-
noring supposedly unimportant features, which includes
breaking symmetries or conservation laws or other prin-
ciples that play a role in other disciplines.
The results shine a harsh light on the idea that fiddling
with income tax systems can rectify the highly unequal
distribution of economic assets that exists today in most
societies. Income taxes are by definition only applied
to changes in wealth and normally vanish for very small
or negative incomes. They, therefore, cannot correct a
situation that is unequal from the outset, at least not
without a substantial redistribution beyond the revenue
an income tax can generate, something like a stable basic
income or a large basic personal deduction that can be
monetized if not taken in as agent income. In our system
this was demonstrated by the fact that income taxes were
applied only to agents that engaged in economic activity.
It is worth mentioning that the unequal distribution
of wealth today is actually a good starting point for in-
troducing a wealth tax. The reason is that effective tax
rates are close to zero for most agents, and nonlinearly
increase to both sides of the wealth distribution. That
is due to the redistribution of revenue from this tax as
it was introduced here. In a situation where most agents
are at the lower end of the wealth spectrum a compara-
tively even smaller percentage of agents will have to pay
substantial amounts of tax. It can be safely assumed,
that the scenario also allows for more mobility between
segments of the society (at least as far as wealth is con-
cerned).
Real economies are perhaps positioned between the
asymmetric and symmetric cases of economic activity dis-
cussed here, with the symmetric case (kinetic exchange)
more benign by having less pressure toward inequality
than the asymmetric case used as a baseline in this
manuscript. This would allow for some flexibility in re-
gard to the actual rate of a wealth tax. However, if so-
cieties want to address their natural tendency to create
inequality and avoid harmful ways of redistribution of
unequal wealth, a wealth tax looks to be the single most
effective tool to achieve progress toward a more just dis-
tribution.
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APPENDIX
Figure 16 shows the Gini coefficients for the flat income
tax regime of Section V A, while Figure 17 shows the Gini
for a progressive income tax scenario (see Section V B).
FIG. 16. Gini coefficient for different flat income tax regimes
at 30%, 60% and 5% with a population of 1,000 agents, start-
ing from an equal distribution of wealth. Starting at ”0”, Gini
indicates substantial inequality in all cases.
As is clearly visible from the application of income tax
schemes at different levels, their effect on wealth distri-
bution is much smaller than the natural pressure for un-
equal distribution of wealth from normal economic ac-
tivity. What is striking is that a progressive income tax
in the current model does not even have the same effect
as a flat tax, likely due to the small spread in income
distribution through individual economic transactions in
our model.
FIG. 17. Gini coefficient for different progressive income tax
regimes with marginal tax rate of 45%, 60% and 75% with a
population of 1,000 agents, starting from an equal distribution
of wealth. Gini indicates even more substantial inequality
than flat tax rate in all cases.
Turning finally to the effects of wealth taxes on eco-
nomic inequality, we show Gini coefficients for the three
wealth regimes we have considered in Section V C. Fig-
ure 18 shows the Gini for the three rates of a flat wealth
tax we considered in Section V C. After quickly growing
from ideal equality at ”0”, the Gini remains in a narrow
band for all wealth tax regimes with an average of around
0.35 for the lowest wealth tax. If one were to apply a 1%
wealth tax only, though, the resulting wealth distribution
would develop the classical exponential distribution, on
par approximately with a 60% flat income tax.
FIG. 18. Gini coefficient for different wealth tax regimes with
a tax rate of 30%, 60% and 5% with a population of 1,000
agents, starting from an equal distribution of wealth. Gini
indicates good economic equality, with fluctuations in bands
of 0.01 to 0.05, with a maximum value of the Gini coefficient
of 0.35 calculated for the lowest wealth tax rate.
